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NECESSITY OR OPPORTUNITY? THE EFFECTS OF STATE 
FRAGILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON 
ENTREPRENEURIAL EFFORTS 
ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the effects of state fragility and economic development on necessity and 
opportunity-based individual entrepreneurial efforts. We contribute to the literature on the 
contextual determinants of entrepreneurship by examining multilevel data on 956,925 
individuals from 51 countries for the period of 2005–2013. We show that state fragility has a 
positive effect on necessity-based entrepreneurial efforts while hindering opportunity-based 
efforts. Our findings illustrate that the level of economic development moderates the relationship 
between state fragility and necessity-driven entrepreneurial efforts reducing the likelihood of the 
latter. We discuss the implications for theory and for pro-entrepreneurship policy. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The different motivations for entrepreneurial decisions influence the impact that a new venture 
may have on society and the economy (Baumol, 1990; Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2013a; 
Williams, 2009). Opportunity-based entrepreneurs start a business in the pursuit of growth, 
profit, innovation, and personal aspirations (Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2014; McMullen, 
Bagby, & Palich, 2008; Reynolds, Bosma, Autio, Hunt, De Bono, Servais, Lopez-Garcia, & 
Chin, 2005). Opportunity-based entrepreneurship (OPP) is linked to innovative activities that 
have the potential to create jobs and increase productivity in an economy (Stenholm, Acs, & 
Wuebker, 2013).  
Necessity-based entrepreneurs, on the other hand, start a business because of “push motives,” as 
a way to compensate for a lack of other sources of employment (Shane, 2009; Valdez & 
Richardson, 2013). Necessity-based entrepreneurship (NEC) is often linked to informal 
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activities, unemployment, economic recession, and poverty (Acs & Amorós, 2008; Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2007; Block & Sandner, 2009; Gries, & Naudé, 2011).   
Drawing from Baumol (1990) and new institutional economics (North, 1990), we posit that the 
national context—in particular, the state’s capacity to provide the foundations for the functioning 
of markets, such as political stability, a clear regulatory framework, and accountable rule 
enforcement mechanisms—shapes incentives for both OPP and NEC entrepreneurial efforts, 
which, in turn, have implications for economic development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
Building on previous research by Ault (2016) and Ault & Spicer (2014), we study the national 
context determinants of entrepreneurship using state fragility.  A concept based on the quality of 
governance and formal institutions, state fragility is “the degree to which the state is unable 
and/or unwilling to fulfil core government functions for the majority of its people, including the 
poor” (Ault & Spicer, 2014). 
The literature on the types of entrepreneurial effort remains rather divided, with scholars of 
entrepreneurship focusing more on the determinants of OPP efforts and such sub-categories as 
high-growth and strategic entrepreneurship (Levie & Autio, 2011). Scholars of economic 
development, however, tend to focus on the causes and effects of NEC efforts (Bruton et al., 
2015). We address one of the empirical and methodological gaps in the literature on OPP and 
NEC efforts: most studies examine country-level rates of entrepreneurial efforts, failing to   
capture the interaction between country and individual drivers (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010; 
Hoskisson, Covin, Volberda, & Johnson, 2011). We extend the research of Bowen and De 
Clercq (2008), McMullen et al. (2008), Valdez and Richardson (2013), and Stenholm et al. 
(2013) by using a multilevel model to examine the effects of country context—in particular, state 
fragility and the level of economic development—on the probability that an individual will start 
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a business for either opportunity- or necessity-based reasons. As control variables, we include 
some demographic characteristics and entrepreneurial attitudes at the individual level, such as 
education, gender, age, social capital, self-efficacy and fear of failure; and some formal 
institutional variables related to entrepreneurship dynamics at the country level, such as labor 
freedom, trade freedom, and unemployment rates. We test our model on a unique sample of 
956,925 individuals from 51 countries, combining primary data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) for the period 2005–2013.  
Our results confirm that low levels of stage fragility provide a stable and well-defined 
institutional framework under which individuals will more likely reap the benefits of OPP 
entrepreneurial efforts over employment (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990). High state fragility 
provides society with less-clear rules and enforcement mechanisms, making it more difficult for 
individuals to plan the investments of their personal and financial resources. This seems to direct 
them towards NEC efforts (Baumol, 1990). The results also show that the effects of state 
fragility on individual NEC efforts are moderated by economic development. In less-developed 
economies, small changes in state fragility have strong effects on the probability that an 
individual will engage in NEC efforts, suggesting that NEC is a mechanism for escaping not only 
from poverty, but also from the failure of the state and its institutions to perform their designated 
functions—a finding consistent with Baumol (1990) and Naudé (2011). In richer economies, 
changes in state fragility have weaker effects on NEC. This novel finding suggests that the link 
between state fragility and NEC efforts is particularly important for poorer economies and 
becomes less important as an economy becomes wealthier. Our contribution to the stream of 
comparative entrepreneurship literature is threefold. First, building on the work of Ault and 
Spicer (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Ault, 2016) and development economists (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
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2012), we study the effects of state fragility on entrepreneurial behaviors. We contribute to the 
research on international comparative entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 2010) by providing a fine-
grained discussion about how state fragility and the level of economic development determine 
cross-country differences for both OPP and NEC efforts, linking previous work that focuses on 
either OPP or NEC with the literature on state fragility and economic development (Bowen & 
De Clercq, 2008; Estrin et al., 2013a; Stephan, Hart, & Drews, 2015a). Our results reveal that the 
effects of state fragility decrease in strength as an economy develops, suggesting that NEC 
efforts might be linked not only to poverty and unemployment, as previously argued, but also to 
the state’s failure to perform its basic functions.  
Second, our analysis of the individual probability of starting an new entrepreneurial venture for 
necessity- or opportunity-based reasons extends the research on different types of entrepreneurial 
effort, which, thus far, has focused primarily on the determinants of average national rates of 
NEC and OPP. Our findings illustrate the effect of the institutional context on different types of 
entrepreneurship using a multilevel design, which allows us to study both individual- and 
country-level factors.  
Third, in testing our hypotheses, we employ nine years of international country-level panel data 
and include a larger set of countries, which extends the scope of our study beyond that of 
previous research with similar research designs (Autio, Pathak, & Wennberg, 2013; Cullen, 
Johnson,  & Parboteeah , 2014; Estrin, Mickiewitz, & Stephan, 2013b; Stephan, Uhlander & 
Stride, 2015b). These three contributions partially address Bruton et al.’s (2010) call for a wider 
inquiry in international comparative studies: “Without such multi-country samples and 
investigations, it is more difficult to be sure that the institutional impact is applicable to a wide 
 6 
set of environments rather than just an idiosyncratic result of the sample of a given country” (pp. 
432–433).  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce the concepts of NEC and OPP 
efforts. In the following section, we introduce the concept of state fragility. We then develop our 
hypotheses related to state fragility and economic development and their effects on 
entrepreneurial efforts. The next section describes our data and explains our methodology. We 
then present a brief discussion of our empirical results on the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and state fragility. The final two sections conclude the study and discuss the 
implications of our results. 
OPPORTUNITY-BASED AND NECESSITY-BASED ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Studies of comparative entrepreneurship tend to focus on national rates of entrepreneurship 
activity, often measured by the total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) rate of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (De Clercq, Lim, & Oh, 2013; Levie & Autio, 2011). 
However, a high rate of entrepreneurial activity does not necessarily lead to positive economic 
outcomes (Shane, 2009). As Baumol (1990) illustrates, entrepreneurial activities differ, and not 
all of them have positive effects on the economy. For example, high rates of self-employment 
may result from the low availability of jobs and not from entrepreneurship-supportive conditions 
(Reynolds et al., 2005; Shane, 2009). Anokhin and Wincent (2012: p. 43) argue: “Where 
individuals plunge into entrepreneurship out of necessity, and not to pursue high quality 
opportunities, one may expect their impact to be underwhelming. Where they go after high 
potential opportunities, they are likely to bring about innovation and improve overall 
competitiveness.” Anhokhin and Wincent (2012) find that total rates of new venture creation are 
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negatively associated with innovation and that the association is mediated by the level of 
economic development.  
To advance the empirical foundations of policies supporting entrepreneurship, it is important to 
go beyond aggregated rates of entrepreneurial efforts and to clarify the determinants of different 
types of entrepreneurial endeavors (Alvarez & Barney, 2014; Reynolds et al., 2005; Valdez & 
Richardson, 2013).  Previous work on the determinants of entrepreneurial efforts focuses mainly 
on OPP because of its potential impact on economic development (Acs, 2006; Bowen & De 
Clercq, 2008; Cullen et al., 2014; Levie & Autio, 2011). However, NEC is also an important 
phenomenon, especially in poor economies, where it is a source of income for individuals 
excluded from the labor market because of their ethnicity, gender, class, age, or lack of skills 
(Amorós & Cristi, 2008; Naudé, 2011). Rates of NEC efforts vary greatly across countries with 
similar income levels, which suggests the need for further inquiry into the role of context for 
NEC (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008).  
Examining average yearly rates of entrepreneurial venture creation in 40 countries between 2002 
and 2004 from the GEM, Bowen and De Clercq (2008) find that financial capital, educational 
capital, and regulatory protection are associated with potential high-growth entrepreneurship, 
whereas corruption and regulatory complexity are negatively associated with it. Their findings 
support Baumol’s argument (1990) that strong formal institutions, such as the quality of the 
regulatory framework and the enforcement of laws preventing corruption, are linked to the type 
of entrepreneurial activity that can aid economic development. 
McMullen et al. (2008) find that entrepreneurial rates of both types are negatively correlated 
with available employment opportunities (which they proxy using gross domestic product, GDP) 
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and positively correlated with labor freedom in their sample of GEM data covering 37 countries 
for the year 2002. McMullen et al. (2008) also argue that institutions influence national rates of 
entrepreneurial activities but that the mechanisms underlying NEC and OPP might differ, thus 
calling for further analysis that includes more countries and individual-level effects. Examining 
different types of institutions, Stenholm et al. (2013) and Valdez and Richardson (2013) show 
cultural, cognitive, and normative institutions to be related to national rates of NEC and OPP in 
their studies covering the years 2007–2008 and 2005–2007, respectively. We extend this 
research stream by examining the effects of state fragility, a construct that captures the quality of 
formal institutions, on individual-level NEC and OPP efforts through a multilevel research 
design applied to a larger sample (more countries and more years), as a number of scholars have 
suggested (McMullen et al., 2008; Levie & Autio, 2011; Valdez & Richardson, 2013; DeClercq 
et al., 2013). 
 
STATE FRAGILITY AND TYPES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL EFFORTS 
Following Ault and Spicer (2014: 1819), who draw from Engberg-Pedersen, Andersen, and Jung 
(2008), we use this definition of state fragility: “the degree to which state power is unable and/or 
unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property, 
basic public services, and essential infrastructure.” State fragility captures the extent to which the 
state is capable of exercising its governance role, establishing the “rules of the game” and 
enforcing them, and providing basic public goods such as security.  
Where the state is not fragile, its institutions lay the basis for economic exchanges to occur and 
sanction behavior that may have negative effects on society, such as violence, theft, and unlawful 
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acquisition of others’ property (Barro, 1991; Knack & Keefer, 1995; North, 1990)1. In more- 
fragile states, institutions often fail to sanction detrimental behavior because of corruption, lack 
of accountability, a malfunctioning legal system, and the state’s overall failure to provide the 
public goods needed for society and the economy to work (Baliamoune-Lutz & McGillivray, 
2008; Knack & Keefer, 1995; World Bank, 2010; UNDP, 20112).  
Although research on state fragility remains scant, there are several entrepreneurship studies 
focusing on different factors encompassed by the concept of state fragility: corruption, political 
violence, the quality of regulatory frameworks, the effectiveness of government, the rule of law, 
and voice and accountability (Ault & Spicer, 2014). Previous researchers found that national 
rates of opportunity-based entrepreneurial activity are influenced by property rights protection, 
which, in turn, is  related to the rule of law, the absence of corruption, and the effectiveness of 
government (McMullen et al., 2008; Autio & Acs, 2010; Estrin, Mickiewitz, & Stephan, 2013b).  
Having stable and suitable protection of private property rights is associated with higher rates of 
formal entrepreneurship (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Thai & Turkina, 2014). The presence of 
corruption, on the other hand, is associated with lower average national rates of OPP efforts 
(Bowen & De Clercq, 2008; Valdez & Richardson, 2013). Badly designed regulation has also 
                                                 
1 There are different categories and conceptualizations of institutions based on sociology and economics (Bruton et 
al., 2010; North, 1990; Scott, 2005). For parsimony, in this research, we focus on formal institutions derived from 
new institutional economics (North, 1990). Formal institutions “refer to the objective constraints and incentives 
arising from government regulations of individual and organizations actions” (Stephan et al., 2015b; 310). 
2 State fragility is a concept highly relevant to practitioners and policy making, as underlined by the fact that it is used 
by multilateral organizations and governments. The World Bank (2010) points out that fragile states are “countries 
facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political 
instability.” 
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been found to have negative effects on venture creation, especially on OPP efforts (Bowen & De 
Clercq, 2008) and entrepreneurial growth aspirations (Estrin et al., 2013a; Levie & Autio, 2011). 
The effect of the overall institutional and governance capacity of the state on different types of 
individual entrepreneurial efforts, which we capture using state fragility, remains to be clarified 
(Stephan et al., 2015a). Accordingly, being an entrepreneur—especially a successful one—in a 
fragile state can attract the attention of criminals and corrupt officials, threatening business 
sustainability and personal security (Collier, 2009; Kistruck, Webb, Sutter & Bailey, 2015). 
Based on the above, we assume that higher levels of state fragility hinder individuals’ 
engagement in OPP efforts. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: State fragility negatively influences the probability that individuals will 
engage in opportunity-based entrepreneurship. 
Fragile states provide only a small share of their citizens with the skills needed to find 
employment (Collier, 2009). Several dimensions of state fragility, including corruption (Bowen 
and DeClercq, 2008), malfunctioning labor markets, cumbersome regulations, and a weak rule of 
law, are associated with high levels of self-employment and informality (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2014; De Soto, 2000; Williams et al., 2016). Fragile states also fail to provide social safety nets 
to protect those who lack formal employment or have lost it, and who must then resort to NEC 
efforts to meet their needs (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: State fragility positively influences the probability that individuals will 
engage in necessity-based entrepreneurship. 
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Economic Development and Different Types of Entrepreneurial Efforts 
Previous studies have attempted to find an association between the types of entrepreneurial 
efforts and economic development (Carree, van Stel, Thurik, & Wennekers, 2007; Sautet, 2013). 
A country’s level of economic development can affect both the rates of entrepreneurial efforts 
and their type (Sternberg & Wennekers, 2005; van Stel et al., 2005). Empirical evidence shows 
that entrepreneurial venture creation rates are higher in poor countries and decline as economies 
become wealthier (Wennekers et al., 2010). As Shane points out, “if you want to find countries 
where there are a lot of entrepreneurs, go to Africa or South America” (Shane, 2009: 143). A 
large percentage of the numerous entrepreneurs in developing countries start ventures—often 
becoming self-employed—in the informal sector in order to meet their basic needs (Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2007).  
Several mechanisms help to explain the relationship between economic development and 
entrepreneurship. Individuals resort to NEC not only to substitute for the absence of employment 
opportunities, but also to meet their basic needs if wage employment fails to provide a sufficient 
income to do so (Margolis, 2014). As economies develop, the number of people who might 
engage in NEC to meet their basic needs decreases because economic development is correlated 
with poverty reduction and an improved standard of living. As average wages increase and the 
opportunity cost of engaging in entrepreneurship becomes higher, the incentives for 
entrepreneurial efforts decrease, especially those aimed solely at gaining a basic source of 
income (Acs, 2006). Economic development also entails more diffused wealth in the form of 
savings, inherited assets, contacts, and wealth of friends and family who might provide support 
mechanisms (Krishna, 2004). Thus, the possibility of purchasing what is required to meet one’s 
basic needs also increases, and this reduces the incentives for NEC as economies develop.  
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In addition, economic development is associated with higher rates of formality. The opportunity 
cost of starting a venture is higher in more-developed economies because it more often entails 
formal registration, fees, and taxes and because average wages are higher—in other words, 
higher transaction costs and, thus, higher entry barriers to entrepreneurship. This suggests that 
individuals who choose to become entrepreneurs in spite of the rather high opportunity costs they 
face in developed economies are likely to do it for OPP-related reasons and not just as a survival 
strategy (NEC). Furthermore, economic development also dictates the sophistication of the 
market: the more developed an economy, the higher the average purchasing power of consumers, 
the more sophisticated their demand for goods and services, and the more diversified the supply 
(Porter, 1990). Thus, in more-developed economies, it is harder to engage in entrepreneurial 
efforts that do not create value or innovate (and, hence, do not qualify as OPP) and yet offset 
their opportunity costs, precisely because of the higher transaction costs and higher 
sophistication of demand and supply. For example, in well-developed fast food markets, it is 
harder for an informal vendor to make a living. In less-developed economies, the formal supply 
of fast food is less diffused, which leaves a gap for informal supply. In a less-developed 
economy, it is easier to copy goods and services observed in wealthier contexts, and the demand 
for goods and services that can be easily provided is less saturated (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland & 
Sirmon, 2009).  
In very poor economies, incentives for OPP are scarce because the preconditions for the most 
productive kind of entrepreneurship may be absent or insufficient, whereas the same reasons 
generate strong incentives for NEC, channeling most entrepreneurial efforts to this sort of 
activity. There can be a kind of vicious cycle whereby the less developed the economy, the lower 
the incentives for OPP, which, in turn, hinder economic growth; however, the more developed 
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the economy, the higher the incentives for OPP, which provide the basis for further economic 
growth and development (Naudé, 2011; World Bank, 2010). Thus, we state the following: 
Hypothesis 3: A country’s level of economic development is negatively related to the 
probability that individuals will engage in necessity-based entrepreneurship. 
Hypothesis 4: A country’s level of economic development is positively related to the 
probability that individuals will engage in opportunity-based entrepreneurship. 
 
 
Economic Development as a Moderator of the Effects of State Fragility on Entrepreneurial 
Efforts 
State fragility determines the types of entrepreneurial efforts through the incentives that the state 
and its institutions generate. As we have argued, the level of economic development also 
influences the incentives for OPP and NEC. State fragility tends to change gradually because of 
the institutional resistance to rapid change. On the other hand, GDP per capita can change 
abruptly due to several factors, such as exchange rates, commodity price fluctuations, or 
economic downturns. These GDP changes interact with state fragility, either enhancing or 
counteracting its effects on entrepreneurial efforts (Di John, 2008; Knack & Keefer, 1995). Thus, 
it is important to study the moderating effect of economic development on the relationship 
between state fragility and entrepreneurial efforts.  
 14 
We assume that economic development moderates the effects of state fragility on entrepreneurial 
efforts because changes in wealth shape the way in which opportunities manifest themselves. 
Households in developed economies have more resources to compensate for the effects of state 
fragility, such as public sector shortcomings with regard to support for the unemployed and the 
elderly or the extraction of bribes by corrupt officers in exchange for access to health services 
that are meant to be free and available to all citizens (Nay, 2013).  
In less-developed economies, the average purchasing power is lower, and households have fewer 
assets, which lowers the number of people who can simply “buy themselves out” of state 
fragility. The need for extra income to purchase goods and services that fragile states fail to 
provide—e.g., accessible health services—pushes individuals into NEC-based entrepreneurial 
efforts (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). This typically means self-employment for people who do not 
earn enough through their other sources of employment or for those who would otherwise not 
work, such as minors (World Bank, 2010).  
Changes in economic development generate incentives for NEC even in the context of non-
fragile states because NEC becomes a means to compensate for unforeseen reductions in 
household revenues (Williams & Vorley, 2015). However, when an economy grows, additional 
purchasing power and improved expectations can generate incentives for entrepreneurs to engage 
in OPP efforts, and this counteracts the hindering effects of state fragility on entrepreneurial 
efforts. This has been manifested in China, where the rise of entrepreneurial firms took place 
between 1990 and 2010, despite the presence of different dimensions of state fragility, such as 
high levels of corruption and cumbersome regulation (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2002; Acs, 2006). 
During periods of economic growth, markets change and the opportunities for OPP multiply, 
leading individuals to take the risks associated with engaging in OPP in spite of state fragility. 
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Economic development also increases the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship because it 
increases average wages and tends to lead to more formalization of the job market (Acs, 2006), 
which should reduce the likelihood of NEC even in fragile states. Thus, improvements in 
economic development can counteract the effects of state fragility and alter the assumed 
incentives for OPP and the disincentives for NEC. In contrast, declines in economic development 
can enhance the effect of state fragility and, thus, generate further incentives for NEC and hinder 
OPP efforts. Accordingly, we propose that economic development moderates the effects of state 
fragility on individual entrepreneurial efforts of both the OPP and NEC types. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5a: The country’s level of economic development positively moderates the  
relationship between state fragility and individuals’ probability of becoming 
opportunity-based entrepreneurs.  
Hypothesis 5b: The country’s level of economic development negatively moderates the 
relationship between state fragility and individuals’ probability of becoming necessity-
based entrepreneurs.  
METHODOLOGY 
We use a multi-level data set to test our hypotheses. Data were retrieved from five different 
sources, and, due the hierarchical structure of our model, we have two levels of data analysis: 
individual and country-year levels.3 Our source for individual-level data is the GEM. The GEM’s 
                                                 
3 Country-level; time-varying institutional indicators and controls. 
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methodology includes the Adult Population Survey (APS), which covers a representative sample 
of the population in each participant country (Autio et al., 2013; Reynolds et al., 2005). We use 
data from the nine-year period 2005–2013 to evaluate the evolution of the entrepreneurship 
dynamics. Our analysis includes 51 countries and covers responses from 956,925 individuals. 
The GEM survey has evolved over time, covering more countries, so the survey was not 
necessarily performed in each country for every year that we include in our analysis. We also 
introduce a restriction in order to capture the time dimension in our analysis, using only countries 
that reported at least four observations in the GEM (this represents 72% of the original number 
of countries and 90% of country-year observations).  
Data for country-year variables were collected from different sources for the same period. We 
augmented the APS data with country-level data retrieved from the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators (WGI), the GEM National Expert Survey, the Index of Economic 
Freedom from the Heritage Foundation, and financial indicators from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
Measures 
Individual-level Dependent Variables 
The GEM data contain various entrepreneurship indicators that have been constructed based on 
the adult population survey (APS). The GEM data provide both individual-level and aggregate 
country-level data about the adult working-aged (18–64 years old) population who are actively 
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involved in starting up a new venture. The Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity Index
4 offers two 
motivational derivations: necessity- and opportunity-based entrepreneurial activity. We test our 
hypotheses using these motivational variables as dependent variables,5 defined as follows.  
Opportunity-Based Entrepreneurship. The first of the dependent variables is the likelihood that 
an individual will be an opportunity-based entrepreneur; this comprises individuals who 
voluntarily create a new venture to pursue perceived business opportunities. These individuals 
have a “pull motive,” such as gaining independence or increasing personal or family income, 
challenge, status, and recognition (Reynolds et al., 2005). The respondents were coded as “1” if 
they met the criteria established by the GEM methodology and agreed with the following 
statement: “I’m in this start-up to take advantage of a business opportunity.” Otherwise, the 
respondents were given the value of “0.”  
Necessity-Based Entrepreneurship. The second dependent variable is NEC. Individuals were 
coded as “1” if they, too, met the GEM criteria and agreed with the following: “I’m in this start-
up because I have no better choices for work.” Otherwise, the respondents were given the value 
of “0.”  
Country-Level Predictors 
                                                 
4 This index is based on the life-cycle of the entrepreneurial process, which is divided into two periods: the first covers 
nascent entrepreneurs who have taken some action to create a new business in the past year but have not paid any 
salaries or wages in the last three months; and the second includes owners/managers of businesses that have paid 
wages and salaries for more than three months but less than 42 months (Bosma et al., 2008). 
5 We also performed the analysis splitting the sample for nascent and owners/managers. The results, which are similar 
to those for the whole sample (early-stage entrepreneurs), are available on request. 
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State Fragility. In order to investigate the role of state fragility in entrepreneurial effort, we 
employ Ault and Spicer’s (2014) measure on state fragility, which comprises a multidimensional 
construct derived from the six components of the World Bank’s WGI (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Zoido-Lobatón, 1999).6 WGI comprises aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 
countries and territories for the 1996–2013 period. The WGI covers six dimensions of 
governance: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. In essence, the six 
dimensions of the WGI cover the key aspects of state fragility (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Engberg-
Pedersen et al., 2008; Mcloughlin, 2012). WGI data have been used in other entrepreneurship 
studies as a measure of the quality of formal governance institutions (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2014; Kim & Li, 2014; Levie & Autio, 2011; Thai & Turkina, 2014). Building on Ault and 
Spicer (2014), we average the six governance indicators and use the measure as a proxy for state 
fragility. The rationale for using state fragility instead of examining individual formal 
institutions, such as the rule of law, is that the different dimensions of state fragility are linked to 
each other and have been found to be highly correlated. The protection of private property 
rights—one of the most basic market-supporting institutions—depends not only on the 
regulatory framework, but also on the rule of law and the absence of threats from corrupt 
officials, criminals, or armed groups (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Political instability and 
violence can severely undermine a state’s capacity to provide public goods, enforce the rule of 
law, and prevent corruption, thus threating all formal institutions (Collier, 2009; Di John, 2008). 
State fragility allows us to study differences in cross-country contexts and their effects on 
                                                 
6 For more information, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
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entrepreneurship in an encompassing way, in line with the established practice of development 
economists and multilateral organizations (Baliamoune-Lutz & McGillivray, 2008; UNDP, 
2011). For convenience in interpreting the results and given our hypotheses, we take the inverse 
of the measure so that a higher number will denote a more fragile state. Ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (low fragile state) to 2.5 (high fragile state).  
Economic Development. We measure economic development using GDP per capita (Aidis, 
Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012; Stephan et al., 2015b). We adjust our measure of GDP using 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in international US dollars, and we use this measure in our 
regressions as the logarithm of GDP in order to improve the interpretation of the results. Data 
came from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics dataset. 
Country-Level Control Variables. In order to test the influence of additional formal institutions, 
we use two sub-indices from the GEM’s National Expert Survey. The first item, government 
support and policies, reflect national experts’ perceptions of the state of entrepreneurship-
specific policy conditions aimed at enhancing new venture creation and entrepreneurial efforts in 
a country. The second item, burden of taxes and bureaucracy on entrepreneurship activities, 
measures national experts’ perceptions of how taxes and different regulatory tasks burden 
entrepreneurial efforts in a country (Levie & Autio, 2008). For both measures, a lower value 
denotes the poor state of government support and possible formal burdens on entrepreneurial 
efforts. See Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of these variables. 
We also use business freedom measures based on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom. The Heritage Foundation has produced this index in partnership with The Wall Street 
Journal for the last 20 years, using it to track the level of economic freedom in 186 countries 
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around the world.7 Specifically, we use labor and trade freedom8 to capture some additional 
regulatory burden associated with entrepreneurial activity (Stenholm et al., 2013). Labor freedom 
is associated with the ability of business to hire and dismiss redundant workers, whereas labor 
rigidity undermines the capacity of entrepreneurs to be flexible in a changing environment. 
Trade freedom measures the economy´s openness to the flow of goods and services, whereas 
trade limitations and regulations put, for example, advanced-technology products and services 
beyond the reach of local entrepreneurs. For both measures, a higher value (0-100 scale) means 
more freedom in a country. Finally, we control the analysis for the unemployment rate as a 
percent of the total labor force, acquired from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics dataset. 
Unemployment is likely to be related mainly with NEC activities, precisely due to the lack of 
formal employment in a given economy. 
Individual-Level Control Variables. Following previous research (see, for example, Autio et al., 
2013), we include three attitude variables that have been linked to entrepreneurial behaviors: a 
proxy for the use of social capital referred to as knowing other entrepreneurs; the individual’s 
perceived self-efficacy in entrepreneurial efforts; and the fear of failure when undertaking new 
business venture activities. The three variables were obtained from the GEM APS data, and they 
all are single items with dichotomous scales for which the value of 0 means “No” and the value 
of 1 means “Yes.” 
                                                 
7 For more information, see http://www.heritage.org/index/about. 
8 We include only the trade and labor freedom measures of the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index because 
its other components, such as “freedom of corruption,” are similar and, therefore, highly correlated with the 
measures of state fragility that we use in our empirical model. 
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1. Knowing Other Entrepreneurs. Knowing other entrepreneurs has a positive effect on the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur (Kwon & Arenius, 2010). This measure reflects 
individuals’ access to social capital, which may influence their entrepreneurial efforts. 
Respondents were asked whether they personally knew someone who had started a 
business in the two years preceding the survey.  
2. Self-Efficacy. Self-efficacy is based on responses about whether the individual perceived 
that he or she has the knowledge, skill, and experience required to start a new business 
(Arenius & Minniti, 2005).  
3. Fear of Failure. This variable measures the individual’s lack of confidence to cope with 
the potential problems (including failure) that could occur during the new business 
venture process (Autio et al., 2013). Respondents were asked specifically whether fear of 
failure would prevent them from starting a business.  
Education. The skill-enhancing effect of education influences entrepreneurial activity: highly 
educated entrepreneurs will recognize more opportunities (Known & Arenius, 2010; Autio et al., 
2010). We calculate a dichotomous variable using answers from GEM individual-level APS data 
about whether the individual had achieved more than a secondary education (0 = “No”; 1 = 
“Yes”).  
Gender. Also taken from the GEM, our gender variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent is 
male and 0 if the respondent is female. Cross-country studies on entrepreneurial behavior have 
shown that early-stage entrepreneurship varies significantly by gender (Bosma et al., 2008; 
Stephan et al., 2015b). 
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Age and Age Squared. Age is an important factor in entrepreneurial activity (Levesque & 
Minniti, 2006). With younger individuals showing higher levels of entrepreneurial activity, age 
squared is regularly also included to capture any non-linear effects (Estrin et al., 2013b; Stephan 
et al., 2015b). The variable is the exact age of the respondent from the GEM APS at the time of 
the interview. 
Table 1 lists summary statistics at the country level. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Data Analysis 
Because we use two levels of analysis, we analyze the data using hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) methods. Multilevel modeling is appropriate when data are hierarchically structured—
that is, when they consist of units grouped at different levels of a hierarchy. In our case, 
individuals belong to a determined region (Aguinis et al., 2013; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 
2006). Using standard multivariate methods, the assumption of independence of observations 
could be violated (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). In other words, we would assume that 
individuals act homogeneously, without taking into account the effect of the environment on 
their decisions. In the case of institutions and entrepreneurship, we observe the same hierarchical 
structure, with individuals in the first level and country-time in the second level. Similarly, Autio 
et al. (2013) demonstrate the utility of a multilevel approach in studies of institutions and 
entrepreneurship, and they encourage GEM data entrepreneurship research to use this approach.  
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We first test whether the choice of multilevel modeling with country-year effects is justified; we 
find that the random intercepts are statistically significant for our two dependent variables.9 
Consistent with our theoretical focus, our dependent variables measure early entrepreneurship 
activity by individuals. The first dependent variable is OPP, and the second is NEC: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1−2𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3−9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10−11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 , 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 are the dependent variables (OPP or NEC); 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑗𝑡 are the country 
predictors; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  are the individual controls; and 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡  are the 
country control variables (in Tables 2 and 3, see the descriptive statistics and correlations of the 
controls, predictors, and dependent variables). The combination of 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 represents the 
random part of the equation, where 𝜀𝑗𝑡 are the country-level residuals, and 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 are the individual-
level residuals.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
RESULTS 
                                                 
9 We run an estimation model with only the country-year effect to test the null hypothesis that the between-
country-year variance is non-zero for the two dependent variables. The test statistic for OPP is 
chibar2(01) = 23288, Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000, and the test statistic for NEC is chibar2(01) = 20111, 
Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000. 
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To investigate potential multicollinearity problems, we calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
for all our variables (Table 4). VIF values greater than ten indicate reasons for concern due to 
collinearity among the variables, and tolerance values less than 0.1 indicate collinearity among 
variables. Therefore, our values do not suffer from collinearity. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Table 5 shows the estimation results. Models 1 and 2 show the control variable models. Models 3 
and 4 explain OPP and NEC, respectively, as proposed in equation 1. Models 5 and 6 introduce 
for the previous specification an interaction term between the GDP level and state fragility. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
With regard to state fragility, we observe that in more-fragile countries, the individual-level 
probability of OPP activity decreases (β = -0.134, p < 0.1).  Although the significance level is 
low, we observe a negative relationship, and the effect on NEC-based entrepreneurial efforts is 
significant and positive (β = 0.197, p < 0.05). This means that an increase of one standard 
deviation in the state fragility increases the probability that an individual will engage in NEC 
efforts by 0.3 percentage point. Thus, our results provide weak support to Hypothesis 1, but they 
support strongly the Hypothesis 2. 
We observe that increases in country-level GDP raise the likelihood of entry into OPP 
(β = 0.318, p < 0.01); the opposite happens in the case of NEC. If the country has a low level of 
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development (β = -0.220, p < 0.01), the likelihood of individuals engaging in entrepreneurial 
activities motivated by necessity increases. For example, in a country with a GDP per capita of 
10,000USD, the average estimated probability of engaging in OPP is 5.1%, while in a country 
with 20,000USD, the average estimated probability increases to 6.3%. In the same exercise 
applied to NEC, the probabilities change from 2.25% to 1.94%, respectively. These results 
support Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
We find a negative, albeit non-significant, effect for the interaction between state fragility and 
the level of economic development on OPP-based entrepreneurial efforts (Model 5). Although 
this negative effect is in line with the arguments of Hypothesis 5a, it is not supported.  
With regard to Hypothesis 5b, we find a significant and negative interaction effect between state 
fragility and countries’ level of economic development (β = -0.0949, p < 0.05). The marginal 
effect is clearly represented in Figure 1, in which the constant line represents the marginal effect 
of state fragility on NEC considering the GDP per capita in its mean value; the decreasing line 
shows the marginal effect evaluated for different GDP per capita levels. Figure 2 shows the 
predicted probability of engaging in NEC-based entrepreneurial efforts as a function of state 
fragility moderated by the country’s level of economic development. We observe that as a 
country improves its quality of governance (i.e., less state fragility), the likelihood of NEC 
decreases, but this effect is stronger in less-developed economies. At higher levels of economic 
development, improvements in governance quality have fewer effects on the likelihood of 
individuals engaging in NEC.  
The coefficients associated with individual-level controls related to attitudinal entrepreneurial 
behavior are stable in all the specifications shown, which is relevant in order to explain the 
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robustness of the results. An analysis of the individual-level control variables shows that the 
probability of becoming an opportunity-based entrepreneur increases with higher levels of 
education, while the opposite occurs with necessity-based entrepreneurship. This is consistent 
with previous research that demonstrates that a higher education level increases the probability 
of becoming involved in pro-growth, OPP new business (Kwon & Arenius, 2010; Levie & 
Autio, 2008). Also, if the individual is a male, the likelihood of engaging in OPP efforts 
increases, but the effect is not significant in the case of NEC-based entrepreneurial efforts.  
Regarding the country-level controls (reported in Table 5), all the models have similar behavior 
in terms of capturing the stability of the outcomes. However, there are disparities in the impact 
on individual-level OPP and NEC efforts. For example, the unemployment rate decreases OPP 
but increases NEC. This is also consistent with some empirical evidence that unemployment 
prompts individuals to undertake entrepreneurial activities as a labor option (Williams et al., 
2016). The influence of additional entrepreneurial framework conditions, such as government 
support policies reported by experts in each country (retrieved from the national experts survey 
in the GEM), have a positive impact only in the case of OPP activity.  
We estimate a pull model only at the country level, using traditional ordinary least squares 
estimation (available from the authors upon request) to verify the robustness of our results. We 
find that state fragility has similar effects on the propensity of the population to engage in 
entrepreneurship activities––negative for OPP and positive for NEC––which supports our 
original results. 
DISCUSSION  
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We study the contextual drivers of necessity-based and opportunity-based individual 
entrepreneurial efforts from a cross-national comparative perspective. Our results confirm that 
state fragility reduces incentives to engage in opportunity-driven entrepreneurial efforts (OPP), 
and that it increases the incentives for necessity-driven entrepreneurial efforts (NEC). This 
outcome is consistent with the tenets of new institutional economics (North, 1990; Minniti 
2008), the work of Baumol (1990), and previous work on national rates of entrepreneurial effort 
type (McMullen et al., 2008; Bowen and DeClercq, 2008). McMullen et al. (2008), for example, 
find that better protection of property rights, a feature of non-fragile states, enhances national 
rates of OPP efforts, whereas Bowen and DeClercq (2008) find a negative correlation between 
corruption, a typical characteristic of fragile states, and high-growth entrepreneurship. 
Our results highlight that state fragility is linked not only with country-level, but also with 
individual-level, incentives to engage in entrepreneurial efforts. State fragility decreases the 
likelihood of engaging in OPP efforts because of uncertainty about the rules and their 
enforcement mechanisms that protect an entrepreneur from contractual breach, intellectual 
property theft, and other events that can threaten the potential to obtain rents from 
entrepreneurial activities.  
Previous work on the contextual drivers of entrepreneurial efforts (Bowen and DeClercq, 2008; 
Levie & Autio, 2010) focus mainly on the contextual drivers of OPP efforts.  Our analysis sheds 
novel light on the determinants of NEC efforts. Our findings show that state fragility amplifies 
the incentives for NEC-based entrepreneurial efforts. State fragility can push individuals towards 
NEC through different mechanisms. In fragile states, extortion, bribe extraction, political 
violence, and a weak rule of law, among other factors, can cause extra expenditures for 
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households, making it necessary for them to engage in NEC efforts to maintain the same level of 
income. State fragility might also entail that citizens get access to services that should be 
provided for free—such as health care or rule enforcement only upon the payment of bribes, 
again causing an increase in the necessary expenditures faced by households. All of the factors 
mentioned above can potentially result in a push for NEC efforts. 
The high transaction costs associated with state fragility because of impediments such as red tape 
and inefficient courts can generate barriers for OPP efforts, but they might not prevent 
individuals from engaging in NEC if it is the only way that they can meet their needs. State 
fragility requires that rules change frequently and unpredictably, and corrupt and malfunctioning 
government institutions distort their enforcement (Dutta & Sobel, 2016). In this context, 
individuals face not only high transaction costs to start a business, but also multiple mechanisms, 
to avoid these transaction costs, such as corruption, informality, and non-compliance with the 
law, especially when engaging in NEC efforts (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Thai & Turkina, 
2013). This argument is in line with Valdez and Richardson’s (2013) results, and it supports 
Baumol’s (1990) arguments on differences in allocation of entrepreneurial efforts. Our findings 
also support the observation that in poor economies and in fragile states, having a large number 
of entrepreneurs does not necessarily boost economic development because their existence is 
highly linked to necessity efforts (Shane, 2009).  
In addition to the role of state fragility, our findings show that economic development is 
positively associated with OPP and negatively associated with NEC efforts. With regard to these 
findings, McMullen et al. (2008) find that GDP––their proxy for employment opportunities––is 
negatively correlated with national-level rates of both OPP and NEC efforts. Our results show 
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that, when examining individual entrepreneurial endeavors in a larger sample with a multi-level 
approach and controlling for a more extensive number of factors, including unemployment, GDP 
affects the likelihood of entrepreneurial engagement, although the effect differs according to the 
type of entrepreneurial effort. In our model, at lower levels of GDP, individuals are more likely 
to engage in NEC efforts and less likely to engage in OPP efforts. At higher levels of GDP, 
individuals are less likely to engage in NEC, but also more likely to engage in OPP efforts. Our 
results provide rigorous empirical support to previous studies that discuss NEC-based 
entrepreneurial efforts as a phenomenon typical of less-developed economies, and that document 
the higher prevalence of OPP efforts in more-developed economies (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; 
Shane, 2009; Wennekers et al., 2010). 
With regard to McMullen et al.’s (2008) work on the role of a country’s state of employment, 
our findings on unemployment show that it influences both OPP- and NEC-based individual-
level entrepreneurial efforts. Our results show that higher levels of unemployment increase the 
likelihood of NEC and decrease the likelihood of OPP efforts. Unemployment means lower job 
opportunities and, thus, a push for NEC, which is in line with the idea of entrepreneurship as an 
alternative source of income when there are no other opportunities (Baumol, 1990; Reynolds et 
al., 2005; Williams et al., 2016). With higher employment levels, entrepreneurial efforts seem to 
be directed to NEC instead of to OPP efforts, the type of entrepreneurial activities that can 
support economic growth and development. We find that the likelihood of OPP efforts increases 
when unemployment is low. Our findings deviate from the arguments of McMullen et al. (2008), 
and this could be explained by the fact that we study a different sample (longitudinal and more 
countries) and use a different model—examining individual entrepreneurial efforts, not national 
entrepreneurial rates—and include a broader set of control variables.  
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One of the key contributions of this study is that we show that economic development moderates 
the effects of state fragility on entrepreneurial efforts. Our results show that as an economy 
develops, the influence of state fragility on NEC efforts decreases. The level of economic 
development determines the extent to which a state can obtain resources via, for example, 
taxation. In poor economies, NEC activities are not linked just to the absence of alternative 
employment sources, but also to the need to compensate with cash for sub-optimal access to 
basic public goods (Naudé, 2011; World Bank, 2010). Therefore, improvements in state fragility 
can have strong implications for poorer contexts. For example, if a country manages to improve 
its security through less-corrupt and better-trained police, individuals might be able to commute 
to formal jobs located in areas that previously were too dangerous to access, and, thus, they 
might disengage from NEC-based entrepreneurial efforts. The more a country develops, the more 
resources individuals and government agencies can employ to limit the negative effects of state 
fragility and, thus, considerably lessen the state fragility’s incentives for NEC efforts.  
Finally, our study contributes to the body of research on the role of national context in 
entrepreneurship by employing a larger sample of countries than previously studied.  This larger 
sample introduces more variation in the levels of economic development and state fragility 
examined. A large share of the additional countries included in our analysis are emerging 
economies, characterized by more violent fluctuations in GDP and more dramatic overall 
transformations (Ciravegna, Fitzgerald & Kundu, 2013). It is possible that the mechanisms we 
observed have not appeared in previous studies because they examined smaller samples, mainly 
of developed economies. Finally, by extending the time series, we also include more points of 
observation where GDP levels change due to economic downturns or growth spurts, as called for 
by Valdez and Richardson (2013).  
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Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
 We adopt a novel empirical approach using a large dataset enabling state-of-the-art multilevel 
models (Stephan et al., 2015b). Yet avenues for future research on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and institutions are still open. With regard to state fragility, our results 
are exploratory, and, thus, some of the related limitations provide opportunities for future 
research. First, as Stephan et al. (2015a) suggest, the contextual drivers of entrepreneurial 
motivation are more complex than the mere NEC versus OPP dichotomy. Thus, a closer look at 
the motivational variation within the NEC and OPP categories would open up a means for novel 
contribution. For instance, OPP-based entrepreneurial efforts might comprise efforts through 
which individuals seek to increase either their independence or their personal income (Bosma et 
al., 2008), and not only to exploit a recognized opportunity. Thus, the motivational differences 
among opportunity-driven entrepreneurs and their institutional determinants across nations and 
over time warrant further investigation. Further work could address differences in the allocation 
of entrepreneurial effort (Baumol, 1990) between formal and informal OPP and NEC activities, 
extending the work of Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra (2014), Thai and Turkina (2014), and Williams 
et al. (2016). For example, variables including the formal registration of new firms versus 
informal sectors could be interesting to test with other types of institutional proxies across 
countries.  
We acknowledge that our measure of state fragility may not capture all of its dimensions and 
focuses mainly on the quality of formal institutions. Future research could further extend the 
work of Ault and Spicer (2014), including different measures of state fragility and its effects on 
entrepreneurial behavior.  
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Our approach excludes some relevant aspects generated by the heterogeneity within countries 
and the ways in which national institutions might regionally shape different types of 
entrepreneurship. Research that highlights less-developed countries or regions will provide more 
insights into the complex relationships among economic development, formal (and informal 
institutions) and new business creations motivations (Acs et al., 2013; Bruton et al., 2008; 
Williams et al., 2016).  
Finally, our analysis does not include the effect of informal institutions. In order to extend the 
research agenda on cross-country determinants of different types of entrepreneurial efforts, it 
will be important to also study the effect of informal institutions (Bruton et al., 2008).  
Implications for Practice 
Our findings have important implications for public policy. Since OPP is more likely than NEC 
to advance a country’s economy (Valdez & Richardson, 2013), policymakers share an interest in 
finding ways to support OPP-based entrepreneurial efforts. We find support for the argument that 
stronger formal institutions support the sort of entrepreneurship that has a better potential impact 
on economic development (Baumol, 1990; Levie & Autio, 2011). This means that improving the 
quality of formal institutions is a fundamental step toward ensuring that individuals undertake 
entrepreneurial efforts to pursue opportunities, and not only to provide necessities. Our findings 
highlight that reducing state fragility has stronger effects on NEC in poorer economies, in which 
NEC may be the only option for escaping destitution (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008). Improved state 
fragility leads to a lower likelihood of NEC, presumably as more people enter into formal labor 
markets and meet their basic needs. Improved state fragility entails not only better regulatory 
frameworks, but also higher state efficiency at integrating the poor into the workforce and 
providing basic public goods, which reduces the need for self-reliance (Ault & Spicer, 2014). In 
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more-developed economies, reducing state fragility becomes more important to support OPP 
than to reduce NEC efforts, suggesting that there may be different types of NEC, depending on 
the average living conditions found in different countries. 
Leibenstein (1968: 83) suggests that public policy should focus on “the gaps, obstructions, and 
impediments in the market network of the economy in question and on the gap filling and input 
completing capacities and responsiveness to different motivational states of the potential 
entrepreneurs in the population.” 
If developing countries do not make the promotion of productive entrepreneurship a main 
concern in their policy agendas, they will only reduce NEC efforts without achieving higher 
growth through OPP efforts (Wennekers et al., 2005). Developing countries must rationally 
organize their functions, improve their governance, and remove the barriers that hamper 
entrepreneurial activity of the OPP type rather than focusing only on reducing unemployment 
and NEC. They need to protect and stimulate property rights and introduce policies that support 
the creativity and efficiency of the private sector. With an adequate environment, especially with 
the reduction of state fragility, entrepreneurship can help improve the economic and social 
conditions in developing economies.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We extend the research of scholars such as McMullen et al. (2008) and Bowen and DeClercq 
(2008) by examining the relationship between state fragility and the type of entrepreneurial 
efforts through a multi-level lenses. This allows us to capture the interaction between country 
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features and individual-level motivation behind entrepreneurial efforts. We contribute to the 
existing scholarly interest in individual entrepreneurial efforts by investigating a larger, more 
diverse sample of countries over a longer time period than in previous multi-level studies 
(DeClercq et al., 2013; Valdez & Richardson, 2013). We show the effects of state fragility, a 
construct that captures the institutional and governance framework needed for economic 
development, on different types of entrepreneurial efforts (OECD DAC, 2007). Our study of the 
relationships linking institutional context, individual entrepreneurial behavior, and economic 
development provides rigorous empirical support for the theoretical work of Baumol (1990) and 
for the institutional theory perspective of entrepreneurship (Williams et al., 2016; Webb & 
Ireland, 2015).  
We illustrate that state fragility hinders opportunity-based entrepreneurial efforts and fosters 
necessity-based entrepreneurial efforts. Our findings also show a not-yet-discussed moderation 
effect—that economic development negatively moderates the relationship between state fragility 
and NEC efforts. Accordingly, state fragility increases individuals’ likelihood of engaging in 
necessity-driven entrepreneurial efforts, especially in less-developed economies. Because all 
types of entrepreneurial engagement face constant uncertainty and environmental changes, state 
fragility reduction seems to be particularly important in enabling the transition from NEC to OPP 
efforts. This is consistent with Baumol’s (1990) argument that the formal institutional context is 
likely to affect the allocation of entrepreneurial activity in different ways. In all, our findings 
suggest that researchers employing institutional theory should focus on how formal institutions 
operate and how their quality, as well as the overall governance environment, influences 
individuals’ engagement in entrepreneurship, interacting with other contextual factors, such as 
economic development. 
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Table 1: Country-level descriptive statistics and mean values of all the variables 
Country N NEC (%) OPP(%) Know Entrep Self-efficacy Fear of Failure Age Gender Education Unemploy ln_gdp State fragility Labor Freedom Trade Freedom Government 
support and 
policies
Taxes and 
bureacracy
Angola 7,615       8.7% 18.8% 0.69 0.66 0.36 31.98 0.54 0.11 6.86 8.42 1.03 44.0 69.2 2.65 2.19
United Arab Emirates 9,016       0.9% 6.9% 0.40 0.61 0.36 33.23 0.69 0.36 3.79 10.58 -0.50 74.0 78.8 3.47 3.31
Argentina 15,594     4.8% 9.8% 0.39 0.64 0.32 38.46 0.46 0.22 8.36 9.23 0.29 46.0 66.5 1.91 1.61
Australia 7,241       1.3% 7.8% 0.35 0.54 0.38 42.13 0.42 0.26 5.01 10.74 -1.59 89.5 80.7 2.40 2.61
Belgium 21,018     0.5% 3.0% 0.28 0.41 0.35 42.24 0.47 0.25 7.88 10.68 -1.31 69.7 85.0 2.98 2.30
Bosnia & Herzegovina 11,864     3.8% 3.3% 0.35 0.55 0.37 41.89 0.47 0.15 26.67 8.42 0.34 58.4 82.9 1.96 1.75
Brazil 33,973     5.1% 10.0% 0.38 0.54 0.39 37.42 0.48 0.09 6.81 9.23 0.00 59.9 69.6 2.23 1.57
Switzerland 15,542     0.8% 5.1% 0.36 0.48 0.33 42.03 0.48 0.15 4.21 11.13 -1.71 81.1 86.8 3.08 3.24
Chile 33,645     4.5% 12.9% 0.45 0.64 0.31 39.21 0.46 0.24 7.51 9.42 -1.18 75.5 84.3 2.79 2.75
China 25,195     6.7% 9.6% 0.58 0.40 0.33 38.52 0.48 0.19 4.27 8.32 0.54 59.6 69.5 2.75 2.66
Colombia 39,410     5.7% 14.3% 0.34 0.61 0.32 37.91 0.47 0.30 11.29 8.79 0.34 74.4 72.1 2.75 2.40
Germany 41,389     1.3% 4.1% 0.34 0.46 0.44 42.90 0.48 0.27 7.62 10.64 -1.46 43.8 85.3 2.94 2.57
Denmark 24,182     0.2% 4.3% 0.43 0.39 0.40 42.00 0.47 0.21 5.03 10.92 -1.85 98.0 84.4 3.08 3.02
Algeria 12,486     2.5% 6.0% 0.56 0.56 0.35 35.54 0.54 0.29 10.38 8.56 0.88 53.8 71.1 3.23 2.69
Ecuador 10,239     7.3% 15.2% 0.39 0.74 0.36 37.84 0.46 0.09 5.21 8.49 0.76 41.8 69.7 2.53 2.05
Spain 225,256   1.1% 4.2% 0.33 0.49 0.49 42.24 0.50 0.25 16.20 10.34 -0.87 50.2 85.6 2.60 2.48
Finland 18,091     0.9% 4.4% 0.49 0.40 0.35 41.76 0.50 0.18 7.69 10.75 -1.86 45.2 85.6 3.34 3.19
France 15,853     0.9% 3.5% 0.41 0.35 0.47 41.15 0.47 0.22 9.09 10.65 -1.22 53.8 81.7 3.29 2.88
UK 126,315   0.7% 3.9% 0.26 0.50 0.36 43.92 0.41 0.12 6.07 10.67 -1.44 78.7 84.9 2.91 2.52
Greece 17,923     1.7% 4.9% 0.35 0.53 0.62 40.80 0.49 0.25 13.99 10.16 -0.49 53.5 81.7 2.09 1.98
Guatemala 8,885       4.2% 9.7% 0.46 0.68 0.33 34.70 0.47 0.03 3.44 8.02 0.59 53.5 83.1 1.83 2.19
Croatia 15,598     2.8% 4.5% 0.38 0.58 0.42 41.71 0.45 0.20 12.41 9.51 -0.37 43.8 84.5 2.18 1.88
Hungary 18,798     1.8% 4.7% 0.30 0.42 0.39 40.29 0.49 0.18 9.14 9.46 -0.78 68.1 83.6 1.99 1.74
Indonesia 11,131     2.2% 6.5% 0.47 0.57 0.36 35.16 0.58 0.18 3.82 7.11 0.28 69.1 52.9 2.44 2.10
Ireland 15,185     1.4% 5.4% 0.37 0.49 0.39 42.14 0.44 0.32 9.63 10.88 -1.50 78.9 85.7 2.99 2.83
Iceland 11,426     0.8% 9.1% 0.62 0.55 0.37 40.67 0.47 0.13 4.12 10.88 -1.67 64.3 83.3 2.87 3.82
Israel 11,361     1.4% 4.6% 0.37 0.38 0.46 38.67 0.47 0.42 6.78 10.31 -0.57 65.0 85.4 2.17 1.93
Italy 18,317     0.6% 2.7% 0.29 0.41 0.48 43.49 0.48 0.10 8.24 10.50 -0.55 63.8 83.4 2.14 1.75
Jamaica 16,942     7.3% 12.2% 0.51 0.80 0.30 36.85 0.47 0.09 11.72 8.47 0.02 68.9 70.3 2.34 1.99
Japan 16,676     1.0% 2.8% 0.21 0.15 0.40 43.20 0.48 0.31 4.35 10.58 -1.22 82.6 81.3 2.60 2.12
Latvia 17,932     2.1% 6.5% 0.40 0.44 0.41 40.92 0.47 0.20 11.92 9.42 -0.65 62.9 85.6 2.48 2.54
Mexico 11,553     0.8% 5.7% 0.49 0.33 0.40 39.60 0.58 0.18 4.77 9.15 0.15 61.0 75.6 2.94 2.63
Macedonia,fyr 7,744       4.4% 3.5% 0.37 0.55 0.41 40.81 0.45 0.24 31.37 8.49 0.08 76.0 83.7 2.46 2.80
Montenegro 10,316     1.5% 7.6% 0.49 0.59 0.32 35.94 0.49 0.15 19.06 8.72 -0.07 83.7 83.3 2.85 2.16
Netherland 23,153     0.6% 5.9% 0.36 0.45 0.32 43.35 0.45 0.19 4.34 10.81 -1.66 61.3 85.5 2.65 2.80
Norway 15,385     0.5% 6.3% 0.39 0.40 0.31 42.63 0.49 0.33 3.32 11.39 -1.72 47.7 87.9 2.33 2.73
Panama 8,003       3.5% 11.3% 0.43 0.59 0.20 37.72 0.47 0.17 4.80 9.07 -0.09 41.7 75.4 2.53 2.94
Peru 15,598     6.7% 18.7% 0.55 0.74 0.33 36.00 0.48 0.14 4.17 8.46 0.28 57.6 79.3 2.30 2.14
Portugal 10,035     1.3% 5.8% 0.30 0.51 0.47 39.81 0.50 0.24 12.71 10.00 -0.95 35.4 87.1 2.45 1.90
Russia 21,994     1.2% 2.8% 0.35 0.27 0.48 39.87 0.45 0.58 6.44 9.36 0.74 45.2 60.6 2.35 2.01
Singapore 11,673     1.0% 6.5% 0.26 0.30 0.39 39.24 0.50 0.22 3.50 10.55 -1.49 96.0 86.7 3.50 4.00
Slovenia 24,126     0.6% 4.0% 0.46 0.52 0.35 41.17 0.47 0.18 6.61 10.04 -0.95 41.8 85.6 2.38 2.05
Sweden 13,161     0.5% 4.3% 0.45 0.43 0.36 43.36 0.48 0.22 7.74 10.87 -1.76 58.5 84.9 2.63 2.38
Thailand 13,362     4.1% 12.4% 0.35 0.43 0.56 40.05 0.45 0.23 0.94 8.36 0.24 76.5 73.0 2.68 2.43
Trinidad & Tobago 6,565       2.5% 14.9% 0.40 0.78 0.19 37.38 0.50 0.36 5.38 9.81 -0.12 77.3 75.5 2.54 2.40
Turkey 47,365     3.1% 6.1% 0.34 0.55 0.33 39.27 0.64 0.34 10.12 9.25 0.07 42.1 84.9 2.76 2.54
Uganda 9,126       13.0% 18.3% 0.68 0.86 0.22 32.65 0.46 0.06 4.09 6.46 0.59 87.9 73.6 2.39 1.98
Uruguay 13,061     2.9% 8.4% 0.39 0.65 0.33 39.40 0.45 0.13 7.66 9.25 -0.76 74.3 82.0 2.36 2.38
USA 27,884     2.1% 8.1% 0.31 0.58 0.33 44.13 0.49 0.42 7.57 10.80 -1.25 95.6 85.8 2.78 2.44
Venezuela 7,031       6.8% 12.8% 0.48 0.69 0.26 36.75 0.42 0.11 8.81 8.96 1.17 33.6 61.2 1.88 1.61
South Africa 16,734     2.0% 4.5% 0.35 0.43 0.29 35.54 0.49 0.05 23.81 8.73 -0.30 57.7 76.2 2.93 2.05
Notes : N i s  the number of observations  
Al l  the variables  in their mean va lues  over the sample period
NEC:  average % of respondants  that declare to be in a  s tart up because they have no better choices  at work
OPP:  average % of respondants  that declare to be in a  s tart up to take advantage of a  bus iness  opportunity
Gender i s  coded Male=1 Female=0
Education takes  va lue of 1 i f individuals  completed secondary education
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of the main variables analyzed 
 
 
*Represents statistical significances at p < 0.05. 
We use the sample size that was used to test our hypotheses. 
LEVEL-1 Variables N Mean Std.Dev Min Max
NEC 1,009,591       0.03 0.16 0 1
OPP 1,009,591       0.07 0.26 0 1
Know Entrep 998,708           0.37 0.48 0 1
Self-Efficacy 1,009,591       0.51 0.50 0 1
Fear of Failure 979,907           0.39 0.49 0 1
Age 1,009,591       40.49 12.93 18 64
Gender 1,009,390       0.49 0.50 0 1
Education 1,009,591       0.25 0.43 0 1
LEVEL-2 Variables N Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Unemploy 356 8.61 5.77 0.70 33.80
ln_gdp 360 9.72 1.06 6.37 11.54
State fragility 359 -0.71 0.76 -1.90 1.26
Labor Freedom 357 62.59 16.29 30 100
Trade Freedom 357 79.96 8.64 24 90
Government support and policies 356 2.57 0.46 1.59 3.67
Taxes and bureacracy 356 2.40 0.56 1.33 4.27
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) NEC 1
(2) OPP -0.0399* 1
(3) Know Entrep 0.0619* 0.1618* 1
(4) Self-Efficacy 0.0967* 0.2052* 0.2409* 1
(5) Fear of Failure -0.0241* -0.0897* -0.0481* -0.1507* 1
(6) Age -0.0269* -0.0676* -0.1231* -0.0146* 0.0082* 1
(7) Gender 0.0130* 0.0653* 0.0964* 0.1383* -0.0697* -0.0258* 1
(8) Education -0.0127* 0.0365* 0.0260* 0.0396* 0.0171* -0.0291* 0.0218* 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) NEC 1
(2) OPP -0.0378 1
(3) Unemploy -0.0238 -0.1078 1
(4) ln_gdp -0.0822 -0.1872* -0.2038* 1
(5) State fragility 0.0562 0.1944* 0.1786* .-0.8542* 1
(6) Labor Freedom 0.0155 -0.0624 -0.152 0.1313 .-0.2956* 1
(7) Trade Freedom -0.1009 -0.1787* 0.1176 0.6371* .-0.6787* 0.1533 1
(8) Government support and policies 0.0206 -0.0956 -0.1838* 0.3396* .-0.4056* 0.2978* 0.2011* 1
(9) Taxes and bureacracy 0.0113 -0.1176 -0.2941* 0.4489* .-0.5418* 0.3125* 0.3253* 0.7247* 1
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Table 4: Multicollinearity test on variables 
 
*VIF values greater than 10 indicate reasons for concern due to collinearity among variables. 
**Tolerance values less than 0.1 indicate collinearity among variables. Our values do not suffer from collinearity. 
 
 
  
Variable VIF* Tolerance**
Gender 1.0 0.97
Age 1.0 0.96
Fear of Failure 1.0 0.96
Education 1.1 0.94
Know Entrep 1.1 0.92
Self-Efficacy 1.1 0.90
State fragility 5.6 0.18
ln_gdp 4.5 0.22
Unemploy 1.4 0.72
Taxes and bureacracy 2.6 0.39
Government support and policies 2.3 0.44
Trade Freedom 2.4 0.42
Financial Freedom 1.3 0.75
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Table 5: Multilevel analysis 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OPP NEC OPP NEC OPP NEC
Individual level controls
Know Entrep 0.799*** 0.402*** 0.803*** 0.399*** 0.803*** 0.400***
(0.00900) (0.0144) (0.00901) (0.0144) (0.00901) (0.0144)
Self-Efficacy 1.582*** 1.114*** 1.584*** 1.113*** 1.584*** 1.113***
(0.0123) (0.0182) (0.0123) (0.0182) (0.0123) (0.0182)
Fear of Failure -0.491*** -0.0610*** -0.492*** -0.0606*** -0.492*** -0.0602***
(0.00989) (0.0151) (0.00990) (0.0151) (0.00990) (0.0151)
Age 0.0898*** 0.0917*** 0.0898*** 0.0916*** 0.0898*** 0.0916***
(0.00244) (0.00386) (0.00244) (0.00386) (0.00244) (0.00386)
Age squared -0.00133*** -0.00117*** -0.00133*** -0.00117*** -0.00133*** -0.00117***
(3.07e-05) (4.81e-05) (3.07e-05) (4.81e-05) (3.07e-05) (4.81e-05)
Gender 0.281*** -0.00877 0.281*** -0.00895 0.281*** -0.00895
(0.00877) (0.0140) (0.00877) (0.0140) (0.00877) (0.0140)
Education 0.269*** -0.358*** 0.257*** -0.349*** 0.257*** -0.349***
(0.0105) (0.0183) (0.0106) (0.0184) (0.0106) (0.0184)
Country level controls
Unemploy -0.0369*** 0.0326*** -0.0329*** 0.0281*** -0.0328*** 0.0287***
(0.00174) (0.00292) (0.00182) (0.00298) (0.00182) (0.00300)
Labor Freedom 0.00402*** -0.00928*** 0.00205 -0.00749*** 0.00215 -0.00680***
(0.00116) (0.00178) (0.00129) (0.00184) (0.00131) (0.00187)
Trade Freedom -0.0174*** -0.00365* -0.0254*** 0.00263 -0.0254*** 0.00235
(0.00136) (0.00218) (0.00161) (0.00257) (0.00161) (0.00258)
Government support and policies 0.202*** -0.00224 0.167*** 0.0323 0.167*** 0.0319
(0.0219) (0.0337) (0.0223) (0.0340) (0.0223) (0.0340)
Taxes and bureacracy -0.0171 0.0214 -0.0339 0.0224 -0.0350 0.0119
(0.0246) (0.0405) (0.0250) (0.0402) (0.0252) (0.0406)
Country level predictors
ln_gdp 0.318*** -0.220*** 0.316*** -0.213***
(0.0330) (0.0456) (0.0334) (0.0459)
State_Fragility .-0.134† .0.197** .-0.0308 .1.139**
(0.0777) (0.0876) (0.292) (0.467)
State_Fragility*ln_gdp .-0.0104 .-0.0949**
(0.0282) (0.0463)
Constant -4.405*** -5.668*** -6.681*** -4.117*** -6.671*** -4.245***
(0.146) (0.236) (0.284) (0.379) (0.285) (0.385)
Residual country-year variance 0.15119 0.50779 0.536 0.373 0.601 0.418
Wald Chi2 44953 7569 45009 7619 44979 7624
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 956,925 956925 956,925 956,925 956,925 956,925
Number of groups 51 51 51 51 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, † p<0.1
Controls Control+Predictors Control+Predictors+interaction
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of State Fragility in the individual level probability of engaging NEC 
based entrepreneurship. Moderated by country development level. 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted probability of engaging NEC based entrepreneurship (%), as a function of 
State Fragility, moderated by country economic development level. 
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Appendix 1 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor National Experts Survey (NES). 
 The National Experts Survey (NES) is one of the worldwide standard questionnaires of the GEM methodology (Levie 
& Autio, 2008; Reynolds et al., 2005). Each year, at least 36 experts in participating countries complete the NES 
questionnaire. These experts are selected following a strict protocol.  NES is divided into sections that evaluate nine 
factors: financial support, government policies, government programs, education and training, R&D transfer, 
commercial and professional infrastructure, internal market openness, access to physical infrastructure, and socio-
cultural norms. These factors are measured using multi-item scales that consider between three and seven questions. 
These questions are answered on a five-point Likert scale (where ‘‘completely true’’ = 1 and ‘‘completely false’’ = 
5). GEM calculates an index for each factor using principal component analysis after accurate analysis of each scale 
feasibility (Cronbach´s Alpha of each construct by year is available by request). 
Empirical studies (Levie & Autio, 2008) have shown that government policies, education and training, and the internal 
market present two sub-divisions for each one. In this study, we employ the two sub-factors that constitute the 
government policies category: 
a) Government support and policies: 
• Government policies (e.g., public procurement) consistently favor new firms. 
• The support for new and growing firms is a high priority for policy at the national government level. 
• The support for new and growing firms is a high priority for policy at the local government level. 
b) Burden of taxes and bureaucracy on entrepreneurship activities: 
• New firms can get most of the required permits and licenses in about a week. 
• The amount of taxes is NOT a burden for new and growing firms. 
• Taxes and other government regulations are applied to new and growing firms in a predictable and 
consistent way. 
• Coping with government bureaucracy, regulations, and licensing requirements is not unduly difficult for 
new and growing firms. 
 
